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Speaking before the IDB Board of Directors, Carmen Reinhart discussed the 
syndrome of “debt intolerance,” whereby countries with weak institutional structures 
and problematic political systems borrow in order to avoid difficult fiscal decisions but 
subsequently find  themselves unwilling or unable to repay. Debt intolerance, it should be 
noted, is by no means a recent phenomenon: the historical record shows  repeated 
defaults by several European countries before 1900 and, in some instances, well into the 
twentieth century.  
For currently debt-intolerant countries, which are found among the emerging 
economies, the threshold for “safe” debt levels is surprisingly low, at approximately 35 
percent of Gross National Product, with attendant risks of default and debt restructuring. 
For some countries, which have histories of bad credit and high inflation, the threshold is 
even lower. Another notable characteristic of debt-intolerant countries is that their debt-
to-GNP ratio is much higher than that of countries with no history of default (on average, 
the figure for frequent defaulters is 28 percent, while that of their non-default peers is 
only 14 percent). Moreover, these ratios appear to predict default more accurately than 
the Institutional Investor country ratings.  
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For purposes of cross-national comparison, countries are divided into three 
“debtors’ clubs.” The first, and most exclusive, consists of advanced economies with 
continuous access to capital markets. At the other extreme are highly indebted poor 
countries with no access to capital markets. Between these two clubs lies a continuum of 
countries with intermittent access to capital, and for them only incremental changes in 
risk can greatly increase the chance of default. That risk is influenced particularly by debt 
level, a history of high inflation, and a history of previous defaults.  
General trends notwithstanding, safe debt thresholds are country-specific and may 
be well above or well below average levels.  
Whatever countries’ debt history may be, it appears that they can graduate from 
debt intolerance through sustained discipline in borrowing. Under almost no 
circumstances has it been possible for countries to grow out of their debts; the only 
available example is provided by Swaziland in 1985. Foreign debt reversals, defined as a 
decline of 25 or more percentage points of GNP within a three-year period, are generally 
achieved by one of the following two means: i) default or restructuring, or ii) significant 
debt repayment. Once countries have achieved debt reversals, though, they must refrain 
from quickly releveraging to previous levels of indebtedness, and they must hold down 
debt levels for approximately 25 years in order to escape the cycle of debt intolerance. 
Experience to date indicates that financial markets cannot be counted upon to discipline 
countries’ borrowing behavior, as the pursuit of high yields has repeatedly led to ill-
advised investments in emerging markets.  
In addition to international debt intolerance, the newer phenomenon of domestic 
debt intolerance poses additional dangers. Before the 1980s domestic debt in developing 
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countries did not represent a great cause for international concern, as financial repression 
through bank financing usually provided access to funds at low interest rates. In addition, 
until that time domestic debt was not widely traded. Following the banking crises in 
many developing countries during  the 1980s, the restructuring and in some case 
privatization of financial systems led governments to seek new sources of debt. 
Movement toward other sources, including debt denominated in foreign currencies, 
increasingly blurred the line between debt placed on domestic and international markets.  
Governments' use of debt to finance deficits appears to have been intensified by 
the effects of structural reform policies such as lower tariff revenues and a reduction in 
the de facto "inflation tax" as macroeconomic discipline figured more prominently in 
national policies.  
The tendency to incur dollarized domestic debt calls for particular attention, as 
this represents a form of domestic debt intolerance. Resulting from the same factors as 
external debt intolerance, namely concerns regarding inflation in national currencies and 
governments' ability to repay, dollarized debt paradoxically makes countries more 
vulnerable due to a currency mismatch between revenues and debts. Given debt-
intolerant governments' past behavior toward foreign creditors, it appears quite possible 
that a wave of restructurings or outright defaults of domestic debt may take place in the 
early part of the twenty-first century.  
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Road map
 Concept of debt intolerance
 Key Findings
 Brief history of debt intolerance
 Debt thresholds, debtor’s  clubs and debt 
intolerance regions
 Debt and the origins of country risk
 Debt reversals
 Domestic debt: the “new” problem
 Policy implications and concluding remarks
Debt intolerance
 Syndrome where weak institutional 
structures and a problematic political 
system make external borrowing a 
useful device for developing country 
governments to avoid hard decisions 
about spending and taxing. 
 Governments suffer from intolerance 
to repayment, not to borrowing. 
Debt intolerance
 Some models suggest that for a range 
of  low external debt, a country’s 
probability of default or restructuring is 
low.
 For a range of high external debt, it is shut 
off from international credit markets. 
 But when external debt is in an intermediate 
range there is an indeterminacy and the 
country  may be suddenly shut off.
Debt intolerance
 Our goal is to operationalize the 
indeterminacy region, so as to 
distinguish among countries in terms 
of their “debt intolerance.”
 We make a first pass at defining the 
range of debt levels at which risks of 
credit events rise significantly, using 
a history of credit events for over 100 
countries going back to the 1820s. 
Key findings
 For debt intolerant countries, “safe”
debt thresholds are surprisingly low
 Serial default is pervasive in history—
it helps explain who is debt intolerant
 Countries rarely “grow out” of their 
debts—default is the most common 
way out
 Domestic debt intolerance may be the 
“new” problem going forward

Early history of default
 European countries set benchmarks 
that today’s emerging markets have 
yet to surpass 
 Spain defaulted 13 times between 1500 
and 1900; 
 Venezuela, the post-1800 record holder 
in our sample, has defaulted on external 
debt “only” nine times.

Debt thresholds
 The debt thresholds for developing countries with 
debt intolerance are much lower than for advanced 
economies. 
 Fewer than 17 percent of all  defaults (or 
restructurings) in middle income since 1970 occurred 
at levels of external debt-to-output above 100 
percent. 
 About one half of the defaults or restructurings 
occurred at debt-to-output levels below the 60 
percent threshold set forth in the Maastricht Treaty. 
This highlights the irrelevance of using advanced 
economies debt-to-output ratios as benchmarks for 
comparisons. 

Debt thresholds
 Our analysis suggests that for 
developing countries as a whole a 35 
percent  external debt-to-GNP 
threshold is reasonable
 For some countries with a poor credit 
and inflation track record that 
threshold is much lower
Debt thresholds
 The countries with no history of 
default borrow far less than those 
with a less pristine credit history
 The mode debt-to-GNP ratio for the 
former is 14 percent—half of the 28 
percent mode for the defaulters.



The components debt intolerance
 Risk measures are influenced by the 
level of debt
 The opposite is also true.
 Next, we turn to defining debt 
intolerance regions for the countries 
where there is a possible 
indeterminacy of equilibrium




Defining Debtors’ clubs
And debt intolerance regions

The origins of debt intolerance
We try to explain the components of 
debt intolerance with information on 
history and “clubs”
Probability of default, 1824-1999
Probability of inflation ≥ 40 percent, 
1958-2001
Advanced economy dummy variable
Robustness checks
 Other measures of credit history
 Panel regressions
 Replacing debt/GNP with 
debt/exports
The origins of debt intolerance
 The effects of debt on country risk 
are very different in advanced and 
developed economies
 Debt levels significantly increase risks 
in developing economies
 A history of high inflation and default 
systematically increase risk and 
separate the developing countries 
into two separate clubs
Country-specific debt 
thresholds
 A contrast of Argentina and Malaysia

Moving in and out of debt 
intolerance regions
 An illustration for the case of Brazil
Graduating from debt 
intolerance
 Five potential candidates
Ranking debt intolerance
 For club B members only: Two simple 
measures
 (external debt/GNP)/IIR
 (external debt/exports)/IIR

Debt reversals
 How have highly indebted countries 
deleveraged—do they typically grow out of 
their debts?
 Definition:  Episodes where external debt 
fell by more than 25 percentage points of 
GNP over a three-year period and where 
either: 
 (1) the decline in the debt ratio was driven by a 
decline of 10 percent or more in the nominal 
value of debt over 3 years or; 
 (2) average growth in the 3-year period is five 
percent or more. 
Debt reversals: results
 For middle income countries, we identified 22 
such debt reversals since 1970
 15 involved some form of default or 
restructuring. 
 In 5 of the 7 episodes that did not involve an 
external credit event, debt ratios were brought 
down through a significant debt repayment.
 Only in one case (Swaziland, 1985), a country 
was able to reduce its external debt to output 
burden by growing out of its debts.
The missing Brady bunch
 Conspicuously absent from the large 
debt reversal episodes are most of the 
Brady restructuring deals of the 1990s. 
 Our algorithm picks up Bulgaria, Costa 
Rica, Jordan, Nigeria, and Vietnam, 
larger countries such as Brazil, Mexico 
and Poland do not show up!
 Why?
Quick to releverage
 For Argentina and Peru, debt-to-GNP was already 
higher three years after the Brady deal than what it 
had been in the year prior to the restructuring. 
 By 2000, 7 of the 17 had ratios of debt-to-GNP  that 
were higher than those at 3 years after the deal 
(Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
and Uruguay)
 In 4 (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru) the debt 
ratio in 2000 was above the levels recorded prior to 
the Brady. 
 By 2002, 3 members of the Brady bunch had once 
again defaulted on their external debt (Argentina, 
Côte D’Ivoire, and Ecuador)
 A few others are teetering are on the brink... 
Domestic Debt and 
Liberalization
 Until the 1980s, 
 few developing governments had 
marketable domestic debt 
 and/or were able to place debt 
domestically without essentially forcing 
banks to hold it through financial 
repression. 
The growth of domestic government 
debt
 Our new data base shows a 
particularly sharp rise in the Asian 
countries but also in a number of 
Latin American countries as well as in 
Turkey.
 A rising fraction of domestic debt is 
linked to a foreign currency.


As regards domestic dollarization...
 It is yet another form of domestic 
debt intolerance
 We find that it is explained by the 
same historical factors (inflation and 
default probabilities) as our measures 
of external debt intolerance.
Behind the growth in domestic debt
 Vanishing revenues
 Higher interest outlays
 Readiness to borrow
 Wider investor base
Concluding remarks
Two points:
1. External debt thresholds
 Are low for emerging market 
countries
 35 percent is conservative but...
 For those countries with a patchy 
history, binding constraints start to 
have teeth at even lower levels of 
debt.
 Thresholds are, above all, country-
specific
2. Domestic debt intolerance
 It seems unreasonable to expect that the 
governments of these countries would 
refrain from doing to their domestic debts 
what many of them in the past have done 
to their external obligations—often more 
than once. 
 A wave of restructurings or outright default 
on domestic government debts seems to 
loom large in the horizon of emerging 
market economies in the early part of the 
21st century.

